Project Scope
Research Problem
Software supply chain attacks are increasing in frequency and sophistication, targeting CI/CD workflows, build systems, and dependency management. Incidents such as SolarWinds and pipeline misconfiguration abuse show that attackers exploit weak oversight and transient runner environments to inject malicious code, manipulate dependencies, and hide persistence.
Forensic readiness is a critical challenge in these environments. Build agents, containers, and runners are ephemeral, so valuable data can disappear immediately after execution. Conventional audit trails capture limited activity but do not preserve the complete forensic chain required for end-to-end reconstruction of incidents.
Integrity assurance is another major gap. Existing pipelines often lack cryptographic binding between artifacts, logs, and dependency metadata. While SBOM adoption has improved transparency and risk management, research highlights weak tamper resistance, untrusted generation paths, and missing verification controls in many practical implementations.
This project addresses the core question: how to design a CI/CD monitoring and evidence collection system that captures volatile forensic data, guarantees cryptographic integrity, reconstructs attack timelines automatically, and generates legally admissible reports with minimal operational overhead and strong compatibility with existing Jenkins workflows.